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Abstract
The main purpose of the present paper is to disentangle the mix-up of the notions of success
and satisfaction which is prevailing in the voting power literature. We demonstrate that
both notions are conceptually distinct, and discuss their relationship and measurement. We
show that satisfaction contains success as one component, and that both coincide under the
canonical set-up of a simultaneous decision-making mechanism as it is predominant in the
voting power literature. However, we provide two examples of sequential decision-making
mechanisms in order to illustrate the difference between success and satisfaction. In the
context of the discussion of both notions we also address their relationship to different
types of luck.
Keywords: success, satisfaction, luck, power
JEL Classification: C79, D02, D71
1 Introduction
In their volume ‘The Measurement of Voting Power’ Felsenthal and Machover (1998) point
out that the idea of the measurement of success has been part of the theory of voting
power since the first scientific contribution in the field by Penrose (1946) and since then
has been rediscovered by several other scholars. Despite this fact the notion of success has
received relatively little attention for a number of decades as - to make use of Laruelle et
al.’s (2006) terminology - it was often regarded to be “just a sort of appendix” of power.
The most prominent early supporters of this view are said to be Dubey and Shapley (1979)
who have proven that there exists a linear relationship between power measured by the
Banzhaf (1965) measure and success measured by their ‘agreement index’, which is an
extended version of the ‘Rae (1969) index’ (see, for instance, Laruelle et al. 2006).1 More
contemporary supporters are Hosli and Machover (2004) who accentuate that the notion of
success is ‘virtually identical’ with the notion of power and that both “differ only in using
a different scale of measurement”. Only recently, Laruelle and Valenciano (2005, 2008)
and Laruelle at al. (2006) have emphasized and vindicated the relevance of success for the
normative assessment of collective decision-making mechanisms and have demonstrated
that the aforementioned view is misleading.
While their contribution deserves to be acknowledged, they still continue to con-
tribute to an ongoing common confusion in the voting power literature: they appear to
regard satisfaction to be a synonym for success. A careful re-examinination of the voting
power literature with respect to both notions leads to the following conclusion. In the lit-
erature we can find two outcome related correspondences being applied: one which relates
an actor’s ‘action’ (or ‘vote’) to the collective outcome, let us call this the ‘action-outcome
correspondence’ (AOC), and a second one which replaces ‘action‘ by ‘inclination’ (or ‘pref-
erence’) and which we will call the ‘inclination-outcome correspondence’ (IOC). Both are
used to define what authors claim to be success or satisfaction, respectively. Moreover, in
the literature we can find a third notion being called ‘(individual-group) agreement’ which
is also used as a label for both correspondences. Note that in comparison to the other two
notions, i.e., success and satisfaction, this one is ‘neutral’ as it leaves it unspecified whether
the agreement on the individual level refers to an action or an inclination.
An overview of the combinations of notions and correspondences applied in the
literature by different authors is given in Table 1.2 In addition to the information included
in Table 1 the following should be noted. In this strand of literature the usual core point of
1Note that Dubey and Shapley (1979) use the notion of ‘agreement’ instead of success and that a proof
of this relationship can also be found in Brams and Lake (1982) who apply the notion of satisfaction. The
relationship between these three notions will be clarified in the course of this paper.
2While Table 1 includes the most prominent sources, we do not claim completeness.
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reference is Rae (1969). He refers to the IOC by speaking about what an actor ‘would like
to have’ with respect to the collective outcome, but does not introduce a certain notion for
this correspondence. Given the nature of his analysis, in our view, the most appropriate
notion appears to be individual-group agreement. This notion is applied by Brams and Lake
(1978) when they refer to Rae (1969). However, when referring to Rae (1969) starting with
Straffin (1977) most authors in the field are careless as they (partly implicitly) claim (i)
that Rae (1969) is referring to the AOC and/or (ii) that he introduced the notion of success
and/or (iii) that success and/or satisfaction are appropriate labels for the IOC. Notable
Table 1: Success and Satisfaction in the Voting Power Literature
Correspon- Notion Source
dence
Success Laruelle and Valenciano (2005, 2008)
Laruelle et al. (2006)
Satisfaction Brams and Lake (1978)
Nevison (1978, 1982)
AOC Straffin at al. (1982)
Laruelle and Valenciano (2005, 2008)
Laruelle et al. (2006)
(Individual-Group) Agreement Straffin (1977)
Dubey and Shapley (1979)
Laruelle and Valenciano (2005, 2008)
Success Barry (1980)
Dowding (1991, 1996)
Grabisch and Rusinowska (2010)
IOC Satisfaction van den Brink et al. (2011)
(Individual-Group) Agreement Rae (1969)
Felsenthal and Machover (1998)
Hosli and Machover (2004)
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exceptions are, for instance, Holler (1982), Felsenthal and Machover (1998), and Hosli and
Machover (2004). Finally, the contributions by Barry (1980) and Dowding (1991, 1996)
deserve some comments. First, it has to be noted that both do not make any reference to
Rae (1969) or any of the other authors listed in Table 1, and that Dowding’s (1991, 1996)
unique point of reference in this context is Barry (1980). Secondly, it has to be mentioned
that Barry (1980), who applies the IOC and uses success as a label for this correspondence,
adds the additional requirement that the actor in question, in order to be successful, must
have chosen an action (‘the actor has tried’) before the collective outcome occurred.3
Having outlined the mix-up in the literature the obvious question of the contribution
of its disentanglement arises, i.e., (i) whether this is of historical interest only, and has no
consequence for an analysis, or (ii) whether there exists an outstanding problem which
could be solved only after this exercise has been completed. The brief answer is that both
are true. We show that (i) applies if we restrict ourselves to the canonical set-up in the
voting power literature, that is simultaneous decision making, as under this set-up success
and satisfaction coincide, while (ii) is correct if we deviate from this set-up, for instance,
by allowing for a sequential decision-making mechanism such as the one introduced in van
den Brink and Steffen (2008, 2012). It will turn out that satisfaction entails success as one
component.
The remaining paper is organized as follows. Section 2 recapitulates the canoni-
cal set-up of a decision-making mechanism in the voting power literature and adds some
further assumptions and definitions required to relax the canonical setup in the course of
our analysis. In Section 3 we investigate the nature of success and satisfaction and pro-
vide general definitions of corresponding measures which are also applicable for sequential
decision-making mechanisms. In Section 4 we discuss the relationship between success and
satisfaction which requires us to address also the notions of power and luck. In Section 5
we illustrate our results from Section 4 by two examples of a sequential decision-making
mechanism. Concluding remarks considering the impact of ‘abstention’ on the relationship
between success and satisfaction are contained in Section 6.
3We would like to note that Barry (1980) himself defines success as the probability to be successful
as defined above. A discussion of this issue can be found in Dowding (1991: 65). Moreover, note that
Barry’s (1980) additional requirement is always fulfilled under the canonical set-up as specified in Section
2 as under this set-up (i) abstention is not permissible and (ii) all actors have to choose their action
simultaneously. The issue of ‘abstention’ and its implications for the relationship between success and
satisfaction are addressed in Section 6.
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2 Preliminaries
A collective decision-making mechanism (DMM) Γ consists of a decision rule and a decision-
making procedure. A decision rule is a function which maps ordered sets of individual
actions into outcomes, i.e., it states which ordered set of actions generate which outcome.
A decision-making procedure provides the course of actions of the actors for a collective
decision and determines the actions to be counted, i.e., which actions go into the domain
of the decision rule.4
Assumption 2.1 For the purpose of this paper let us make the following assumptions
regarding Γ:
1. Proposals submitted to the decision-making body are exogenous: it is the task of the
decision-making body either to accept or to reject a proposal, i.e., we have a binary
outcome set O = {approval, rejection}.
2. A proposal can be submitted to the decision-making body only once.
3. The decision-making body contains a finite set of actors: N = {1, ..., n} with n > 1,
whose actions bring about a collective outcome of the decision-making body.
4. Each actor i ∈ N has a binary action set: Ai = {yes, no}, where the choice of the
yes-action means that i supports the proposal and the choice of the no-action that i
rejects it.5
5. All actors choose their action simultaneously 6
6. Each actor i ∈ N has a binary inclination set: Ki = {approve, reject} containing i’s
feasible attitudes towards a proposal.
Remark 2.2 Note that we treat inclinations and preferences as synonyms. They express
what actors ‘want’ or ‘like’. Hence, they have to be distinguished from the actors’ choice
of action.
In the voting power literature the canonical set-up of an DMM Γ is based on the first
five assumptions of Assumptions 2.1. Such a canonical set-up is, usually, represented by a
4For further details, see van den Brink and Steffen (2008, 2012).
5This excludes the option of abstention as a tertium quid, which can have a considerable impact on the
power distribution among the actors (see, for instance, Felsenthal and Machover 1997 1998, and Braham
and Steffen 2002). In Section 6 we will briefly address the possibility of abstention in the context of the
analysis of the present paper.
6Note that this implies that a secret but sequential decision-making procedure is permissible as well.
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simple voting game (SVG), being a pair (N,W) where W is a collection of subsets called
‘coalitions’, which satisfies the following three conditions: (i) ∅ /∈ W , (ii) N ∈ W , and (iii)
if T ∈ W and T ⊆ T ′, then T ′ ∈ W (monotonicity). A coalition T ⊆ N is said to be
winning or losing according to whether T ∈ W or T /∈ W . This definition implies that
an SVG can also be represented by W only. Moreover, a coalition T can be regarded as
an ‘index’ of the actions of actors who have chosen the same action, for instance, ‘yes’ if
T ∈ W . Whether a coalition is winning or losing is determined by the decision rule being
applied.
The analysis of the canonical set-up represented by an SVG is primarily based on
the membership of actors in coalitions. For this reason van den Brink and Steffen (2008,
2012) have called this approach the ‘membership-based approach’. They also introduced
an ‘action-based approach’ which allows other DMM’s, in particular it allows sequential
decision making where it can happen that not all actors will be allowed to choose an action.
This has already been taken into account for the formulation of Assumption 2.1.7 Next,
we define action and inclination profiles.
Definition 2.3 Given a subset of actors S ⊆ N , an action profile a = (ai)i∈S on S is a
non-empty ordered set of individually chosen actions ai ∈ Ai, i ∈ S.
Note that it is not required that an action profile contains an action for every actor.
However, all actors have an inclination as expressed in the following definition:
Definition 2.4 An inclination profile k = (ki)i∈N is a ordered set of inclinations ki ∈ Ki,
i ∈ N .
So, an inclination profile k contains one, and only one, inclination ki for each i ∈ N . We
denote the collection of all action profiles on any S ⊆ N by AN , and the collection of all
action profiles containing an action of actor i (i.e. the action profiles on {S ⊆ N | i ∈ S})
by ANi . We denote the actors who are choosing an action in an action profile a by N(a),
i.e. N(a) = S for a = (ai)i∈S. Further we denote the collection of all inclination profiles
on N by KN .
Remark 2.5 Assumptions 1, 4 and 5 listed under Assumption 2.1 together with the as-
sumption that agents choose a dominant strategy whenever it exists, imply that under
the canonical set-up all actors will always act sincerely, i.e., they will choose an action
which corresponds with their own inclinations as it is a dominant strategy for each actor
to choose its own first choice (see, for instance, Laruelle and Valenciano 2008: 55). If, for
instance, an actor i has the inclination to ‘approve’ a proposal it will always choose the
7For a detailed description of the ‘action-based approach’ we refer to van den Brink and Steffen (2008).
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yes-action. From this we can infer that under the canonical set-up there is no need for
a separate modeling of the actors’ inclinations, assuming that an actor chooses its action
according to its inclination. Hence, its representation by a bare SVG is sufficient.
Remark 2.6 Assumptions 4 and 5 of Assumption 2.1 together imply that all actors are
not only allowed, but are also obliged to choose an action which goes into the domain of
the decision rule.
Remark 2.6 allows us to specify Definition 2.3 for the canonical set-up as follows:
Definition 2.7 A simultaneous action profile a = (ai)i∈N , is a non-empty ordered set of
individually chosen actions ai ∈ Ai, i ∈ N .
So, a simultaneous action profile a contains one, and only one, action ai for each i ∈ N .
What is left to be formulated at this stage are expressions denoting the probabilities that
a permissible action profile a and a feasible inclination profile k being compatible with a
occurs. The latter is required as for a sequential DMM Γ it can happen, that more than
one inclination profile k is compatible with a single action profile a (see Section 5).
Definition 2.8 Consider an DMM Γ. An inclination profile k is compatible with action
profile a if, and only if, for all i ∈ N(a) it holds that (i) ki = ‘approve’ if ai =‘yes’, and (ii)
ki =‘reject’ if ai =‘no’. We denote by p(a,Γ) the probability of the occurrence of an action
profile a, and by p˜(k, a,Γ) the probability of an inclination profile k which is compatible
with a.
We denote the set of all inclination vectors that are compatible with action profile a by
K(a).8 We introduce the notation ki ∼ ai meaning that the inclination ki corresponds
with the action ai of actor i in the sense that ‘ki = approve’ if ai = ‘yes’, and ‘ki = reject’
if ai = ‘no’. Similar, we use the notation ai ∼ o, o ∈ O, meaning that the action ai
corresponds with the outcome o in the sense that ai = ‘yes’ if ‘o = approval’, and ai = ‘no’
if ‘o = rejection’. Finally, we use the notation ki ∼ o, o ∈ O, meaning that the inclination
ki corresponds with the outcome o in the sense that ki = ‘approve’ if ‘o = approval’, and
ki = ‘reject’ if ‘o = rejection’.
9
8So, p(·,Γ) is a probability distribution over AN , while p˜(·, a,Γ) is a conditional probability distribution
over K(a).
9Note that it would be possible to ‘code’ the actions, inclinations and outcomes by 0 and 1, in which
case the correspondences ∼ defined above could be simply written as equalities. We chose not to do that
in this paper to make clear the distinction between actions and inclinations, which is essential for the
difference between success and satisfaction (and luck) later on.
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Remark 2.9 Note that from remarks 2.5 and 2.6 it follows immediately that under the
canonical set-up there exists one, and only one, inclination profile k which corresponds to
an action profile a, i.e., ∀a : ∃ k˜ : p˜(k˜, a,Γ) = 1, while ∀ k 6= k˜ : p˜(k, a,Γ) = 0, since
N(a) = N in the canonical set-up.
3 Success and Satisfaction
At the outset of this section let us start with a definition of the notions of success and sat-
isfaction. For this purpose we refer to Collins English Dictionary (2009) and the American
Heritage Dictionary of the English Language (2011):
Definition 3.1 Success is ‘the favourable outcome of something attempted’.
Remark 3.2 The reference to an ‘attempt’ in Definition 3.1 implies that success inherently
requires an action. However, it is ‘inclination-free’ as no reference is made to whether that
what was attempted was something the actor desired or not.
Definition 3.3 Satisfaction is ‘the fulfilment of a desire’.
Remark 3.4 The reference to a ‘desire’ in Definition 3.3 implies that satisfaction inher-
ently requires an inclination. However, it does not necessarily require an action as it is
feasible that a desire can be fulfilled without having made any attempt at all.10
Thus, in general, success and satisfaction are distinct concepts. Making use of definitions
3.1 and 3.3 we can now define how success and satisfaction ought to be ascribed to an actor
being a member of a decision-making body under an DMM Γ, which is characterized by
the assumptions as listed under Assumption 2.1. We ascribe success to i if, and only if, i’s
chosen action corresponds with the collective outcome.
Definition 3.5 Let S ⊆ N and a = (ai)i∈S be an action profile with ai ∈ Ai for all i ∈ S.
Then, the success ascription to i ∈ S, given the collective outcome o(a,Γ) ∈ O is given by
SUCi(a,Γ) =
{
1 if ai ∼ o(a,Γ)
0 otherwise.
(3.1)
10This can be illustrated by the following example which we owe to Matthew Braham. Assume that
you have the desire to become rich, but you are not doing anything to achieve this. Instead, you are lying
on the beach enjoying the sun and the fresh air. However, suddenly one of the seagulls circling over your
head drops a valuable diamond which just falls into your lap. Thus, your desire has been fulfilled even
you have not attempted anything to achieve this, if we assume that you were not aware of the fact that it
might happen that a seagull drops a valuable diamond during the time you are lying on that beach.
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Remark 3.6 If the canonical set-up is represented by an SVG, success is ascribed to an
actor i if, and only if, i is a member of a winning coalition, i.e., if, and only if, (i ∈ T ∈
W) or (i /∈ T /∈ W) (see, for instance, Laruelle and Valenciano 2005, 2008).
We ascribe satisfaction to i ∈ N , if and only if, i’s inclination ki ∈ k corresponds with the
collective outcome o ∈ O, where the collective outcome results out of an action profile a,
which is compatible with the inclination profile k. Note that the collective outcome o is
the same for all inclination profiles k which are compatible with the action profile a.
Definition 3.7 Let k = (ki)i∈N be an inclination profile. Then, the satisfaction ascription
to i ∈ N , is given by
SAT i(k,Γ) =
{
1 if ki ∼ o(a,Γ) for a ∈ AN with k ∈ K(a)
0 otherwise.
(3.2)
Based on Definitions 3.5 and 3.7 we can now formulate corresponding success and satisfac-
tion measures.The success of an actor i ∈ N in a decision-making body applying an DMM
Γ is measured by i’s probability to be successful, i.e., by summing-up over i’s weighted
success ascriptions SUCi(a,Γ) for all feasible action profiles a ∈ ANi where i chooses an
action.
Definition 3.8 The success measure SUC of a decision-making body applying an DMM
Γ is given by
SUCi(Γ) =
∑
a∈ANi
p(a,Γ) SUCi(a,Γ) for each i ∈ N. (3.3)
The satisfaction of an actor i ∈ N in a decision-making body applying an DMM Γ is
measured by i’s probability to be satisfied, i.e., by summing-up over i’s weighted satisfaction
ascriptions SAT i(k,Γ) for all feasible inclination profiles k.
11
Definition 3.9 The satisfaction measure SAT of a decision-making body applying an
DMM Γ is given by
SATi(Γ) =
∑
a∈AN
p(a,Γ)
∑
k∈K(a)
p˜(k, a,Γ) SAT i(k,Γ) for each i ∈ N. (3.4)
11Note that van den Brink et al. (2011) are making use of a version of this measure. However, referring
to Straffin et al. (1982) they were unaware of the fact that the correspondence used in Straffin et al. (1982)
does not coincide with Rae’s (1969).
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Remark 3.10 Based on definitions 3.5 to 3.9 in conjunction with remarks 2.5 and 2.6
it is straightforward to see that under the canonical set-up being applied in the voting
power literature the values of both measures will always coincide. Hence, there exists no
good reason for the usage of two separate measures. As the canonical set-up is, usually,
represented by an SVG which relates actions to collective outcomes, but does not include
any inclinations, it appears to be reasonable that in this context studies focus on the success
measure and ignore the satisfaction measure. This is, in fact, what we can observe in the
recent voting power literature (see, for instance, Laruelle and Valenciano 2005, 2008).
4 Satisfaction, Success, Power, and Luck
After having discussed the notions of success and satisfaction and its measurement in
Section 3 their relationship still remains to be clarified. For the purpose of this exercise let
us begin with a brief discussion of Barry’s (1980) well-known equation ‘success = power
+ luck’.12 In Section 1 we already adressed Barry’s (1980) definition of success which
according to our analysis in Section 3 is, in fact, a definition of satisfaction. However,
when referring to Barry (1980) in the more recent literature authors have just replaced the
IOC, which Barry (1980) originally presupposes, by the AOC (see, for instance, Laruelle
and Valenciano 2005, 2008, Laruelle et al. 2006, and, referring to Laruelle and Valenciano
2005, also Rusinowska and de Swart 2006 and Grabisch and Rusinowska 2010). In a similar
fashion, when referring to luck the same authors have also replaced Barry’s (1980) original
definition of ‘luck’ by an essentially different one. We will come back to this issue in the
course of this section. However, before we would like to specify the notion and measurement
of power which we apply for our analysis.
The notion of power in this paper is based on Braham (2008) and Morriss (1987/2002).
In a social context they define power as an ability (or capacity) to effect (i.e., to ‘force’
or ‘determine’) outcomes and regard power to be a dispositional concept, i.e., power ex-
ists whether it is exercised or not. Following Braham (2008) we say that an actor i has
power with respect to a certain outcome if i has an action (or sequence of actions) such
that its performance under the stated or implied conditions will result in that outcome
despite of the actual or possible resistance of at least some other actor. That is, power is a
claim about what i is able to do against some resistance of others irrespective of its actual
occurrence.
12Note that Barry (1980) does not use the notion of ‘power’ in this context, but refers to decisiveness.
However, by this notion he means what is usually called ‘power’ in the voting power literature. For a
discussion of this issue see, for instance, Dowding (1991: 63-68, 1996: 52-54) or Felsenthal and Machover
(1998: 41).
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We ascribe power to an actor in an action profile if, and only if, this actor acts
in this profile and by choosing a different action from its action set is able to alter the
collective outcome against some resistance of others (represented by those chosen actions
of the other actors which are not in line with the ‘new’ action of the actor in question).
In this case we say that the actor has a swing . With respect to our analysis it needs to
be noted that for an DMM Γ the notion of a swing as used in the canonical setup is no
longer sufficient since an actor changing its action in a certain action profile, might lead
to other actors, who did not have an action in that action profile, to get the possibility to
act. On the other hand, it might be that actors who did act now cannot act anymore. As
a result, it might be that by changing its action an actor might (but not necessarily does)
change the outcome. Therefore, we have to distinguish between strong and weak swings
(see Section 6, but also van den Brink and Steffen 2008, 2012 for the case of a sequential
DMM).
Let S ⊆ N , and a = (aj)j∈S be an action profile containing action aj ∈ Aj, j ∈ S.
Then, we say that i has a strong swing if by altering its choice of action, i forces, ceteris
paribus, a new collective outcome.13 Given action profile a = (aj)j∈S, actor i ∈ S, and
alternative action aˆi ∈ Ai \ {ai}, we denote by Aai,aˆ = {a˜ = (a˜j)j∈T ∈ AN | T ⊆ N, i ∈
T, a˜i = aˆi and a˜j = aj for all j ∈ S ∩ T} the set of all action profiles that are possible
after actor i changes its action from ai to aˆi.
Definition 4.1 Let S ⊆ N , and a = (aj)j∈S be an action profile containing actions aj ∈
Aj, j ∈ S. Then, we say that i ∈ S has a strong swing in S, if there is an aˆi ∈ Ai \ {ai}
13As van den Brink and Steffen (2008) point out it is important to draw attention to the interpretation
of the ceteris paribus condition in this context. Its common interpretation is that the actions of all other
actors remain constant. That is, if i alters its action the only effect that can result out of this is a change
in the collective outcome (then we say that i has a swing and we ascribe power to i). While this ‘all
other things being equal’ interpretation is appropriate for simultaneous DMMs, it no longer applies for our
more general case of a sequential DMM, which may allow certain actors to exclude other actors from the
decision-making as a result of their choices. If we have an action profile and we alter i’s choice of action it
can happen that the decision-making process requires either the exclusion of actions of other actors from
the domain of the decision rule and, hence, from the action profile, or the inclusion of actions by other
actors in the domain of the decision rule and, therefore, in the action profile. If such information would be
ignored, we can end up with an inappropriate power ascription. In order to avoid this problem we have
to go back to the idea behind the literal ‘all other things being equal’ interpretation of the ceteris paribus
clause. The basic idea of the ceteris paribus clause is a comparison between two possible worlds: the world
as it is (our initial action profile and its associated collective outcome) and the world as it would be if an
action were changed (the resulting action prole and its associated collective outcome if i’s choice of action
were altered). In contrast to the standard interpretation of the ceteris paribus clause our analysis does
not necessarily require that all other components of the action profile remain constant after we altered i’s
choice of action; it requires that the action profiles after the initial change by one actor are consistent with
the DMM. This interpretation of the ceteris paribus clause is underlying definitions 4.1 and 4.2.
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such that o(a˜,Γ) 6= o(a,Γ) for all a˜ ∈ Aai,aˆ.
Let S ⊆ N and a = (aj)j∈S be an action profile containing an action aj ∈ Aj,
j ∈ S. Then, we say that i has a weak swing, if by altering its choice of action, it is, ceteris
paribus, feasible that a new collective outcome emerges, but that the outcome does not
change necessarily.
Definition 4.2 Let S ⊆ N , and a = (aj)j∈S be an action profile containing actions aj ∈
Aj, j ∈ S. Then, we say that i ∈ S has a weak swing in S if there exists an aˆ ∈ Ai \ {ai}
and a˜ ∈ Aai,aˆ such that o(a˜,Γ) 6= o(a,Γ), and also there exists an aˆ ∈ Ai \{ai} and a˜ ∈ Aai,aˆ
such that o(a˜,Γ) = o(a,Γ).
Remark 4.3 Note that under the canonical setup of a simultaneous DMM there exist no
weak swings. Hence, all swings are strong. For a given action profile a = (aj)j∈N actor
i ∈ N has a swing in a if o(a˜,Γ) 6= o(a,Γ) with a˜ = (a˜j)j∈N such that a˜j = aj for all
j ∈ N \ {i}.
Based on Definitions 4.1 and 4.2 we can now extend the usual definition of a swing
in order to include the distinction between weak and strong swings. We do this by fully
counting all strong swings and counting weak swings only for a fraction  ∈ [0, 1].14
Definition 4.4 Let S ⊆ N and a = (ai)i∈S be an action profile. For  ∈ [0, 1], the power
ascription to i ∈ S, is given by
POW

i(a,Γ) =

1 if i has a strong swing in a
 if i has a weak swing in a
0 otherwise.
(4.5)
The power of an actor i ∈ N in a decision-making body applying an DMM Γ is
measured by i’s probability to have a swing, i.e., by summing-up over i’s weighted power
ascriptions POW

i(a,Γ) for all feasible action profiles a.
Definition 4.5 For  ∈ [0, 1], the power measure POW  of a decision-making body apply-
ing an DMM Γ is given by
POW i (Γ) =
∑
ai∈ANi
p(a,Γ) POW

i(a,Γ) for each i ∈ N. (4.6)
14Note that van den Brink and Steffen (2008) demonstrate that it is not necessary to specify the value
of  for binary DMMs.
11
Now, in order to link the notion (and measurement) of power with the notions (and
measurement) of success and satisfaction as defined in Section 3 we will make use of two
different notions of luck.15
The first notion of luck is based on Barry (1980) and Dworkin (1981). Barry (1980)
has introduced the notion luck in the context of studying power and defines it as (the
probability) of ‘getting what one wants even when one does nothing’, i.e., if ‘one does not
act’, where according to our understanding the word ‘even’ is just a careless rhetorical
flourish.16 Barry’s (1980) definition of luck, we will use the notion Barry luck to refer to
this, is in line with Dworkin’s (1981) notion of brute good luck which he distinguishes from
good option luck. The latter type of luck is related to “deliberate and calculated gambles
... - whether someone gains or loses through accepting an isolated risk he or she should
have anticipated”, while brute luck is regarded to be “a matter of how risks fall out that
are not in that sense deliberate gambles.”17
Let S ⊆ N \ {i}, a = (aj)j∈S be an action profile not containing an action from
actor i ∈ N \S, and k ∈ K(a) be a corresponding inclination profile containing inclination
ki ∈ Ki for actor i. Then, we ascribe brute good luck (or Barry luck) to i if, and only if, i’s
inclination ki corresponds with the collective outcome o(a,Γ) ∈ O, but i did not act.
15Note that, as pointed out by Dowding (1991: 64) with respect to one of these notions, both notions
must be carefully distinguished from what he call’s personal identity luck, i.e., “the luck of being the
particular person one happens to be” which is discussed by egalitarians (see, for instance, Roemer 1986 or
Cohen 1989).
16For a critical discussion of the probability requirement in Barry’s (1980) luck definition see Dowding
(1991: 65, 1996: 52f). Moreover, we would like to point out an inconsistency in Barry’s (1980) analysis.
His definition of decisiveness being: ‘the difference between his success [making use of the IOC] and his
luck. ... it represents the difference that it makes to his success if he tries.” Hence, whenever an actor
tries according to this definition it is decisive, i.e., if i is a dummy actor and i chooses an action, i.e., i
tries to get what it wants, i would be decisive. However, this is not what is usually meant by the notion of
decisiveness (see Footnote 11) and Barry (1980) himself later in his essay writes that decisiveness means
to be ‘critical’, i.e., to have a swing. Now one might argue, that Barry (1980) has meant this and that a
dummy actor by definition cannot ‘try’, but this would mean that the notion of a ‘try’ presupposes the
ability to be successful with the ‘try’. However, this contradicts also the very basic meaning of a ‘try’ as
being just an attempt in order to achieve something, whether one has the ability to do so or not. Taking
this criticism into account one could re-define Barry’s (1980) definition of luck to be: ‘getting what one
wants if one does not try or if one tries without being critical with respect to the action profile in question’.
Note that the second part of this definition is the definition of action luck as contained in Definition 4.8.
17Dworkin (1981) illustrates the difference between both types of luck by an example of bad luck: “If
someone develops cancer in course of a normal life, and there is no particular decision to which we can
point as a gamble risking the disease, then we will say that he has suffered brute bad luck. But if he
smoked cigarettes heavily then we may prefer to say that he took an unsuccessful gamble”, i.e., he has
suffered bad option luck.
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Definition 4.6 Let S ⊆ N \ {i}, a = (aj)j∈S be an action profile not containing an action
from actor i ∈ N \ S, and k ∈ K(a) be a corresponding inclination profile containing
inclination ki ∈ Ki for actor i. Then, the brute good luck ascription to i, is given by
BGLi(k, a,Γ) =
{
1 if ki ∼ o(a,Γ)
0 otherwise.
(4.7)
Remark 4.7 Remark 2.6 implies that under the canonical set-up brute good luck does not
exist as all actors are obliged to choose an action.
The second notion of luck which we call action luck is based on Laruelle and Va-
lenciano (2005, 2008). Let S ⊆ N and a = (aj)j∈S be an action profile containing actions
aj ∈ Aj, j ∈ S. Then, we ascribe action luck (AL) to i ∈ S if, and only if, (i) i acts
in action profile a and (ii) i’s chosen action ai corresponds with the collective outcome
o(a,Γ) ∈ O, but i has no swing in a.
Definition 4.8 Let S ⊆ N and a = (aj)j∈S be an action profile containing actions aj ∈ Aj,
j ∈ S. Then, the action luck ascription to i ∈ S, is given by
ALi(a,Γ) =
{
1 if ai ∼ o(a,Γ), but i has no swing in a
0 otherwise.
(4.8)
Remark 4.9 Note that Laruelle and Valenciano (2005, 2008) mistakenly claim that their
notion of luck (which we called action luck) is the notion of luck which has been proposed
by Barry (1980).
Based on definitions 4.6 and 4.8 we can now formulate corresponding brute good
luck and action luck measures. The brute good luck of an actor i ∈ N in a decision-making
body applying an DMM Γ is measured by i’s probability to have brute good luck, i.e.,
by summing-up over i’s weighted brute good luck ascriptions BGLi(k, a,Γ) for all feasible
action profiles a where i does not act.
Definition 4.10 The brute good luck measure BGL of a decision-making body applying
an DMM Γ is given by
BGLi(Γ) =
∑
a∈AN\ANi
p(a,Γ)
∑
k∈K(a)
p˜(k, a,Γ)BGLi(k, a,Γ) for each i ∈ N. (4.9)
The action luck of an actor i ∈ N in a decision-making body applying an DMM Γ
is measured by i’s probability to have action luck, i.e., by summing-up over i’s weighted
action luck ascriptions ALi(a,Γ) for all feasible action profiles a where i does act.
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Definition 4.11 The action luck measure AL of a decision-making body applying an DMM
Γ is given by
ALi(Γ) =
∑
a∈ANi
p(a,Γ) ALi(a,Γ) for each i ∈ N. (4.10)
Making use of the notions of brute good luck and action luck we can now state
that ‘satisfaction = success + brute good luck’ and that ‘success = power + action luck’,
which yields that ‘satisfaction = power + action luck + brute good luck’. The second and
third equality only hold if we count weak swings and strong swings equally (i.e., if we
take  = 1).18 For the case  = 1 we shortly denote POW i(a,Γ) = POW
1
i (a,Γ) and
POWi(Γ) = POW
1
i (Γ).
Proposition 4.12 For a decision-making body applying an DMM Γ the following general
equations hold:
(i) SAT (Γ) = SUC(Γ) +BGL(Γ)
(ii) SUC(Γ) = POW (Γ) + AL(Γ)
(iii) SAT (Γ) = POW (Γ) + AL(Γ) +BGL(Γ)
Proof
(i) For all i ∈ N , we have
SUCi(Γ) +BGLi(Γ)
=
∑
a∈ANi
p(a,Γ) SUCi(a,Γ) +
∑
a∈AN\ANi
p(a,Γ)
∑
k∈K(a)
p˜(k, a,Γ)BGLi(k, a,Γ)
=
∑
a∈AN
i
ai∼o(a,Γ)
p(a,Γ) +
∑
a∈AN\ANi
p(a,Γ)
∑
k∈K(a)
ki∼o(a,Γ)
p˜(k, a,Γ)
=
∑
a∈AN
p(a,Γ)
∑
k∈K(a)
ki∼o(a,Γ)
p˜(k, a,Γ)
=
∑
a∈AN
p(a,Γ)
∑
k∈K(a)
p˜(k, a,Γ) SAT i(k,Γ) = SATi(Γ),
18In fact, it is also possible to allow for any  ∈ [0, 1] but in that case we also need to redefine action luck
taking account of weak and strong swings. Since this paper focusses on the distinction between success
and satisfaction, we will not do that.
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where the first equality follows by definition of SUC and BGL, the second equality follows
from the definitions of SUC and BGL, the third equality follows since ki ∼ ai for all
a ∈ ANi implies that∑
a∈AN
i
ai∼o(a,Γ)
p(a,Γ) =
∑
a∈ANi
∑
k∈K(a)
ki∼o(a,Γ)
p(a,Γ) p˜(k, a,Γ),
and the fourth and fifth equality follow from the definitions of SAT and SAT , respectively.
(ii) For all i ∈ N , we have
POWi(Γ) + ALi(Γ)
=
∑
a∈ANi
p(a,Γ) POW i(a,Γ) +
∑
a∈ANi
p(a,Γ) ALi(a,Γ)
=
∑
a∈AN
i
i has a swing in a
p(a,Γ) +
∑
a∈AN
i
, ai∼o(a,Γ)
i has no swing in a
p(a,Γ)
=
∑
a∈AN
i
i has a swing in a
ai∼o(a,Γ)
p(a,Γ) +
∑
a∈AN
i
i has a swing in a
ai 6∼o(a,Γ)
p(a,Γ) +
∑
a∈AN
i
, ai∼o(a,Γ)
i has no swing in a
p(a,Γ)
=
∑
a∈AN
i
i has a swing in a
ai∼o(a,Γ)
p(a,Γ) +
∑
a∈AN
i
, ai∼o(a,Γ)
i has no swing in a
p(a,Γ)
=
∑
a∈AN
i
ai∼o(a,Γ)
p(a,Γ) =
∑
a∈ANi
p(a,Γ)SUCi(a,Γ) = SUCi(Γ),
where the first equality follows by definition of POW and AL, the second equality follows
from the definitions of POW and AL, the fourth equality follows since i has a swing in
a implies that ai ∼ o(a,Γ), and the fifth and sixth equality follow from the definitions of
SUC and SUC, respectively.
(iii) obviously follows from (i) and (ii).
If an DMM Γ applied by a decision-making body is a canonical one, we obtain the following
general equation ‘satisfaction = success = power + action luck’ which is quite close to Barry
(1980), but contains the notion of luck as proposed by Laruelle and Valenciano (2005, 2008).
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Corollary 4.13 If the DMM Γ applied by a decision-making body is a canonical one, we
obtain the following general equation:
SAT (Γ) = SUC(Γ) = POW (Γ) + AL(Γ) (4.11)
Proof
This follows since in the canonical set-up all actors act, and thus (i) an actor has success
if, and only if, it has satisfaction and (ii) there is no brute good luck.
Remark 4.14 Corollary 4.13 reflects the content of Remark 3.10, i.e., that satisfaction
and success coincide under the canonical set-up.
What remains to be demonstrated is that there exist applications for which brute good luck,
which creates the wedge between satisfaction and success, plays an essential role. This is
done in Section 5 by two examples of a sequential DMM.
5 An Application: Sequential Decision-Making Mech-
anisms
Following van den Brink and Steffen (2008, 2012) let us assume a sequential ‘one desk’
DMM. Regarding the nature of the actor we have to distinguish between three types of
actors: (i) ‘bottom-’, (ii) ‘intermediate-’, and (iii) ‘top-actors’. ‘Bottom actors’ are those
actors in the decision-making body who have a contact to the outside world and have
the potential to receive new proposals, i.e., each decision-making body has at least one
‘bottom-actor’. If there exists more than one bottom-actor we assume that a proposal
enters the decision-making body via one of these actors with equal probability (‘one desk’
model). If a bottom-actor receives a proposal and does not support it by choosing the
no-action, the proposal is regarded to be rejected by the decision-making body, i.e., the
decision-making process is terminated. However, if the actor supports it by choosing the
yes-action, it will be forwarded to the next actor in the decision-making process. This
could be either an intermediate- or top-actor. It is an ‘intermediate-actor’ if regarding
the consequences of its choice of action the same applies as for a bottom-actor, i.e., the
difference between both types of actors lies just in the fact whether the actor has a contact
to the outside world and can receive new proposals or not. A ‘top-actor’ is an actor who
has no successors in the decision-making process.19 Hence, its choice of action leads always
19Note that the terminology successor-predecessor is opposite to the one as used in van den Brink and
Steffen (2012). In van den Brink and Steffen (2012) both notions are used to refer to the positions of
actors in a hierarchy, i.e., if actor i directly dominates an actor j, we say that i is a predecessor of j, and
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to a final collective decision on the proposal, i.e., a rejection of the proposal if it chooses the
‘no-’ and an approval if it chooses the yes-action. Hence, top-actors are the only actors in
the decision-making body who can finally enforce an approval of a proposal, while all actors
have the ability to reject it (when they are allowed to choose an action). This implies that
any sequential DMM in addition to at least one bottom-actor must also contain at least
one top-actor, while the existence of intermediate-actors is not a necessary requirement.
Assumption 5.1 Let us add the following assumptions to those made under Assumption
2.1, where assumption 5 is now replaced by assumption 7:
7. All actors choose their action sequentially, where each actor i ∈ N has not more than
one chance to be involved in the decision-making, i.e., to choose its action.
8. New proposals entering the decision-making body can only be received by the bottom-
actor(s) being actors in positions with no predecessors in the decision-making process.
This process continues then via the intermediate-actor(s) - if they exist - to the top-
actor(s).
9. A new proposal can only be received by one bottom-actor at the same time (One Desk
Model).
10. The choice of the yes-action results (i) in a final approval if actor i is the top-actor,
i.e. if i has no successor in the decision-making process, or (ii) in forwarding the
proposal to one or more successors if i is not the top-actor.
11. The choice of the no-action results in a final rejection of the proposal, if (i) actor i
is a bottom actor, or (ii) if for the actor who has forwarded the proposal to i there
is no other successor in the decision-making process left to ask for supporting the
proposal whose individual support contains the potential of a final approval. If such
other successor as in case (ii) exists it results in forwarding the proposal to this actor.
Remark 5.2 Note that under DMMs applying in addition to Assumption 2.1 also As-
sumption 5.1 - the latter contains a set of assumptions which are characteristic for hi-
erarchical organizations (see van den Brink and Steffen 2008, 2012) - an actor i can be
excluded from the decision-making for two reasons: (i) if i is an intermediate- or top-
actor the decision-making process could have already been terminated by another actor
(which could be a bottom- or intermediate-actor) by choosing the no-action, or (ii) if the
decision-making body contains more than one bottom-actor and the proposal has entered
that j is a successor of i. In the present paper we make use of the same terminology to refer to actors in
a sequential DMM, i.e., if an actor i chooses its action after actor j has made its choice of action, we say
that actor i is a successor of j, and that j is a predecessor of i.
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Figure 1: Extensive Game Form Γ1
the decision-making body via a bottom-actor such that subsequent decision-making process
does not include i as an actor.
Clearly, in such sequential DMM’s actors who are non-top-actors have strong and weak
swings. A non-top-actor has a strong swing in action profiles where it is allowed to choose
an action and where it chooses the yes-action and all its successors in the decision-making
process choose the yes-action as well (leading to an approval of the proposal), while the
proposal would be rejected if the actor chooses the no-action. It has a weak swing in every
action profile where a non-top-actor is allowed to choose an action and where it chooses
the no-action (leading to rejection of the proposal), while the proposal could be approved
(if all its successors in the decision-making process who are allowed to choose an action
choose the yes-action), but also could still be rejected (if there is at least one successor
who is allowed to choose an action and chooses the no-action). A top-actor has two swings
which are both strong.
Making use of Assumptions 2.1 and 5.1 we will now investigate two simple sequential
DMMs in order to illustrate the relationship between satisfaction, success, and power and
the usage of the related measures.20
Example 5.3 Let Γ1 be a sequential DMM with N = {1, 2, 3} where all actors choose
their action sequentially in numerical ascending order, i.e., actor 1 is the unique bottom-,
actor 2 is an intermediate-, and actor 3 is the unique top-actor. Γ1 can be represented by
the extensive game form as given by Figure 1. Our satisfaction, success, and power analysis
is displayed by Table 2 assuming uniform probability distributions.
As it can be seen from Figure 1 and Table 2 under Γ1 we have four action profiles a. In one
of them actor 3 and in another one actors 2 and 3 are excluded from the decision-making
20Note that Γ1 and Γ2 in examples 5.3 and 5.4, respectively, could be regarded as examples for DMMs
in hierarchical organizations, where the structure of the hierarchy is a ‘line’ in case of Γ1 and a ‘star’ in
case of Γ2 (see van den Brink and Steffen 2008, 2012).
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Figure 2: Extensive Game Form Γ2
due to the fact that another actor, i.e., actor 2 in the former and actor 1 in the latter case,
has chosen the no-action. Satisfaction of the excluded actors under these profiles is then a
result of their brute good luck, only.
The next example includes also the second type of exclusion as explained in Remark
5.2, i.e., exclusion due to the existence of more than one bottom-actor.
Example 5.4 Let Γ2 be a sequential DMM with N = {1, 2, 3}. Let us assume that nature
chooses with probability 0.5 whether bottom-actor 1 or 2 will receive a new proposal. After
having received a proposal the bottom-actors can reject a proposal on their own, while for
an approval both require the consent of top-actor 3. Γ2 can be represented by the extensive
game form as given by Figure 2. Our satisfaction, success, and power analysis is displayed
by Table 3 assuming uniform probability distributions.
6 Concluding Remarks
The major purpose of this paper is to disentangle the relationship between satisfaction
and success. Despite the fact that both notions are conceptually distinct they are mixed-
up in the voting power literature. We have pointed out that a potential explanation for
this phenomenon is the fact, that both notions coincide under the canonical set-up which
assumes a simultaneous DMM. Clarifying the relationship between both notions we found
that the notion of luck requires an disentanglement as well. We illustrated the requirement
for the disentanglements of all three notions by replacing the canonical simultaneous DMM
19
by a sequential DMM, which allows that, under specific circumstances, some actors are
excluded from the decision-making.
Now we would like to wind-up this paper with some remarks on the relationship
between satisfaction and success if we allow for ‘abstention’ as a tertium quid. That is
what Barry (1980) assumes when he illustrates his notion of luck under a simultaneous
set-up. Hence, one might be tempted to argue that brute good luck can also exist under a
simultaneous DMM if one allows for ‘abstention’ as a tertium quid. However, this would
be mistaken as allowing for ‘abstention’ is nothing else than an extension of the action
set: ‘abstention’ is an action an actor can choose in addition to the ‘yes-’ and no-action.
In contrast to the ‘non-action’ of an excluded actor under a sequential DMM, an actor
choosing the ‘abstention-action’ is not excluded from the decision-making by the definition
of the decision-making procedure, but only due to its own choice of action not to opt in
favor or against a proposal. Hence, we cannot ascribe brute good luck to such an actor.
However, we also cannot ascribe action luck to such an actor as its choice of action does not
correspond with the elements of the binary outcome set. What we require is a third notion
of luck which we may call abstention luck being an additional component of satisfaction:
‘satisfaction = success + brute good luck + abstention luck’.
Regarding the ascription of abstention luck we have to distinguish between two
principal cases if an actor chooses the ‘abstention-action’: (i) the actor has an inclination
for one of the two elements of the outcome set, i.e., the actor either approves or rejects
the proposal, but for certain reasons decides to choose the ‘abstention-action’, for instance,
because the costs for performing the other actions are too high, or (ii) the actor is indifferent
between the two elements of the outcome set. In the latter case we will always ascribe
satisfaction to the actor, while in the former case satisfaction will only be ascribed if
the collective outcome corresponds to its specific inclination for a unique element of the
outcome set.
Finally, by making use of Barry’s (1980) terminology we would like to point out
that the difference between success and abstention luck can be characterized by the fact
whether an actor ‘has tried’ or ‘has not tried’. Remember that in Section 1 we noted
that for his definition of success Barry (1980) adds the requirement that ‘the actor has
tried’ which we used as a synonym for ‘having chosen an action’. While both coincide
under the canonical and our sequential set-up (see Footnote 3), this no longer holds if we
allow for ‘abstention’ as a tertium quid. In this case we have to distinguish between two
types of actions: (i) actions which imply that by their choice an actor ‘tries’ to obtain a
specific collective outcome, e.g., the approval of a proposal by choosing the yes-action, and
(ii) actions which imply that by their choice an actor ‘does not try’ to obtain a specific
outcome. Actions of type (i) can lead to success, while actions of type (ii) can lead to
20
abstention luck.
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